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Abstract In social contexts, errors have a special signiW-
cance and often bear consequences for others. Thinking
about others and drawing social inferences in interpersonal
games engages the mentalizing system. We used neuroim-
aging to investigate the diVerences in brain activations
between errors that aVect only agents themselves and errors
that additionally inXuence the payoVs of interaction part-
ners. Activation in posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC)
and bilateral insula was increased for all errors, whereas
errors that implied consequences for others speciWcally
activated medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an important
part of the mentalizing system. The results demonstrate that
performance monitoring in social contexts involves addi-
tional processes and brain structures compared with indi-
vidual performance monitoring where errors only have
consequences for the person committing them. Taking into
account how one’s behavior may aVect others is particu-
larly crucial for adapting behavior in interpersonal interac-
tions and joint action.
Keywords Error-monitoring · Mentalizing · Medial 
frontal cortex · Cingulate cortex · Social neuroscience · 
Perspective-taking
Introduction
Performance monitoring is crucial for successful goal-
directed behavior. After commission of an error, preventing
future errors and their negative consequences can be
achieved by Xexibly adapting one’s behavior. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demon-
strated that posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) plays a
crucial role in error-monitoring and subsequent behavioral
adaptation (Ridderinkhof et al. 2004). PMFC involves mid-
cingulate cortex (MCC) and pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA) and shows increased activation during error
detection (De Bruijn et al. 2009). An electrophysiological
correlate of this error-related brain activity is the error-
related negativity (ERN), an event-related brain potential
(ERP) that is generated after an erroneous response
(Falkenstein et al. 1990; Gehring and Willoughby 2002)
and negative feedback (Holroyd and Coles 2002). Coupling
of fMRI and electroencephalography (EEG) has speciWed
its origin being localized in the rostral cingulate zone
(RCZ) of pMFC (Debener et al. 2005). The anterior insula
is modulated by error awareness and has shown to be more
active during errors of which one was aware compared with
unaware errors (Ullsperger et al. 2010; Klein et al. 2007;
Hester et al. 2005). Outcomes that signal a failure to attain
the intended goal may give rise to aVective and motiva-
tional responses to errors (Gehring and Willoughby 2002;
Luu et al. 2000).
Both ERP and fMRI studies show that the detection of
others’ errors relies on similar neural mechanisms as own
error-processing (van Schie et al. 2004; De Bruijn et al.
2009; Shane et al. 2009). Monitoring the actions of others
is relevant in a variety of social interactions, especially in
joint action, thus when coordinating actions in order to
achieve a common goal. When acting together, a failure of
one person may aVect the interaction partner as well, e.g.,
most drastically by precluding the common goal to be
reached, but also simply by altering the motivation of the
other to continue working on the task. In real life, errors are
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cial signiWcance. An incorrect performance may yield nega-
tive consequences not only for agents themselves but also
for other persons involved in the situation. These conse-
quences may be evident, e.g., in material outcomes and rep-
utation. A very explicit situation is a team sport like soccer
when, for instance, missing a penalty kick aVects not only
the particular player who has missed it but also the team as
a whole with regard to the Wnal score. This may even
extend to their reputation and the perceived competence of
their coach, who, in turn, may face another cascade of neg-
ative consequences that starts with being Wred, might go on
with family members not meeting the expenses for certain
costs of living anymore, etc.
However, taking into account how one’s actions might
aVect others occurs almost automatically in daily life
and often serves as an important guideline for decision-
making. Although there are various everyday life situations
where errors imply consequences for others, up to now,
error-monitoring research has focused on errors that aVect
only the individual who has committed them. Although
some studies investigating neural correlates of action
observation include manipulations in such a way that
actions of an agent have consequences for the observer,
the focus usually lies on the observer and not the individ-
ual who is performing and therefore responsible for the
consequences (De Bruijn et al. 2009; Marco-Pallares et al.
2010).
On the contrary, social inferences, i.e., thinking about
others (Wrst level) and reXecting about what others think
about oneself (second level), have been extensively investi-
gated within the last decade, especially from a social neuro-
science perspective, and pertain to higher-level cognitive
processes (Ochsner et al. 2005). Anticipating others’
actions or reasoning about triadic relations (relations
between two minds and an object; Saxe 2006) entails acti-
vation of the mentalizing system (Van Overwalle 2010).
Neuroimaging studies have shown that the mentalizing sys-
tem involves parietal cortex, temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), temporal pole, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
(Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009; Frith and Frith 2003).
Of these, mPFC is the area of greatest relevance to “online”
mentalizing during interactive paradigms (Assaf et al.
2009). According to the distinction of Van Overwalle
(2010), mPFC is located between 30 and 60 mm on the
y-coordinate (posterior-anterior axis), whereas pMFC com-
prises the posterior part of the medial frontal cortex and is
located between the 0 and 30 mm y-coordinate. This is in
line with the theoretical model proposed by Amodio and
Frith (2006), which subdivides medial frontal cortex (MFC)
into anterior rostral MFC (arMFC; activated by social cog-
nition tasks) and posterior rostral MFC (prMFC; activated
by cognitive tasks) (Amodio and Frith 2006). Inferring
traits and attributes about the self and others has been
shown to selectively engage mPFC (Van Overwalle and
Baetens 2009) of which especially the dorsal part is
involved in spontaneous social-cognitive processing (Ma
et al. 2010; Mitchell et al. 2006a). A further functional divi-
sion of mPFC into a dorsal and a ventral subregion is pro-
posed by Mitchell et al. (2006b) based on the perceived
similarity of the other person: Whereas self-referencing
tasks and mentalizing about similar others engage the
ventral mPFC, dorsal mPFC activation is evident during
mentalizing about dissimilar others. However, this diVeren-
tiation does not reXect diVerences in valence (Mitchell et al.
2006b).
When committing an error also bears consequences for
others, reXecting about their thoughts and other second
level mentalizing processes are likely to be initiated.
Therefore, social inferences about the scope and impact of
one’s errors on others may not be limited to activation of
the error-monitoring network, but also engage areas
related to mentalizing. Furthermore, the speciWc context
might play a role as a competitive setting poses diVerent
mentalizing demands than a cooperative one and goes
in hand with enhanced mPFC activation (Decety et al.
2004).
The aim of the current study was to investigate the diVer-
ences in brain activity between errors that aVect only the
actors themselves and errors that also have consequences
for others. The diVerential impact of errors was manipu-
lated by using a cooperative versus a competitive setting
that implemented distinctive payoVs for others. For errone-
ous compared with correct trials, activation in pMFC and
insula should be evident irrespective of the particular set-
ting and consequence, underlining their crucial role in
error-monitoring. When comparing the context that implies
consequences for others to the context that aVects only the
agents themselves, we expect engagement of areas related
to mentalizing, such as parietal cortices and mPFC. Our
main focus lies on the diVerences in brain activation
between errors in the two contexts. We expect to Wnd
increased activation in mPFC for errors that additionally
have an impact on others compared with errors that aVect
only the individual who has committed them. Although our
manipulation of competition and cooperation diVered from
the one used by Decety et al. (2004), mPFC activation
might further by modulated by the setting in such that a
competitive, compared with a cooperative, setting entails
higher activation of especially dorsal mPFC for errors that
also aVect an opponent than errors that only bear conse-
quences for oneself. However, the Wndings by Mitchell
et al. (2006a) do not suggest a diVerentiation in mPFC
activity based on valence.123
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Participants
The same subjects as in De Bruijn et al. (2009) were
recruited. We measured brain activity in 34 healthy partici-
pants (16 female, mean age = 25.6 years, SD = 3 years)
who played a challenging computer game independently
(solo) and in cooperation with or in competition against
another person (duo). Of these, 20 participants (9 women,
mean age = 26.2 years, SD = 3.2 years) were assigned to a
cooperative setting for the duo condition and 14 partici-
pants (7 women, mean age = 24.7 years, SD = 2.4 years)
were assigned to a competitive one. Note that a diVerent
analysis of the data from the duo session addressing a
diVerent functional question was already published in De
Bruijn et al. (2009). Participants provided written informed
consent prior to participation and the study was approved
by the local research ethics committee.
Task and design
Participants performed a computerized task, the cannon
shooting game (see Fig. 1). The aim of the task was to stop
a horizontally moving cannon (triangle) by a button press,
precisely lining it up with a stationary target in order to
shoot the target (square). The size of the target was dynam-
ically adapted based on participants’ performance such that
a mean hit rate of around 60% was achieved.
Participants started with a Wnancial bonus of 5 Euro in
both the solo condition and the competitive setting, while
the cooperative setting was enforced by a bonus of 10 Euro.
Committing an error was always associated with a mone-
tary loss (10 cents) for the participant. In the duo condition,
errors additionally bore consequences for the other player,
either monetary loss (cooperative setting) or gain (competitive
setting; each 10 cents). Correct responses had no eVect on
any player’s bonus.
For each experimental session, two participants came
into the lab and were introduced to each other. They
received instructions together, after which one participant
went to one scanner and the other participant to the other.
They were told that during the duo condition the other
player would see the same computer screen they saw
while performing the task. Unknown to the real partici-
pant, the other participant was a confederate. The confed-
erate was always the same person (a woman) throughout
the entire experiment. Participants performed two blocks
of the task, equivalent to the solo and the duo condition,
with 100 trials each. The order of blocks was counterbal-
anced between subjects. Afterward, a questionnaire was
administered outside the scanner to assess subjective
ratings about, e.g., diYculty of the task, bonus motiva-
tion, or feelings, via a visual analog scale with a length of
100 mm.
The original setup included additional conditions (i.e.,
observing others’ performance) that allowed to disentangle
brain activity of error and reward processing, which have
been previously reported elsewhere in the context of
observed error-processing in diVerent settings (De Bruijn
et al. 2009).
Stimulus presentation was controlled with Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, NY, USA).
The onset of the trial was jittered with a blank screen for
0, 250, 500, 750, or 1,000 ms. Null events were added to
allow the blood-oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD)
response to go back to baseline. A trial started with the
presentation of the target and the cannon. Target location
was randomly determined on each trial, while the cannon
was always horizontally centered. Immediately following
presentation, the cannon started moving either to the
right or to the left for a maximum of 2.5 lengths
Fig. 1 Cannon shooting task and payoV matrix. Examples of a correct
(a) and an incorrect action (b) are shown. fMRI was time-locked to the
presentation of the feedback, always containing the crucial information
about the correctness of the performed action. (c) PayoV matrix for the
two conditions. Committing an error was always associated with a
monetary loss (10 cents) for the participant. In the duo condition, errors
additionally bore consequences for the other player, either monetary
loss (cooperative setting) or gain (competitive setting; each 10 cents)123
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(thumb up/thumb down) was presented 500 ms following
the button press, indicating whether the response resulted
in a hit or a miss.
Data acquisition
Imaging was performed at 3T on a Siemens Trio scanner
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) at the Max Planck Institute
for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Ger-
many. Twenty-eight functional slices were obtained paral-
lel to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure (AC–
PC) line using a single-shot gradient echoplanar imaging
(EPI) sequence (repetition time, 2 s; echo time, 30 ms;
64 £ 64 pixel matrix; Xip angle, 90°; Weld of view,
192 mm) sensitive to blood–oxygen level-dependent con-
trast. Trials occurred at multiple, systematically oVset time
points (range 0–.5 s) in relation to the image acquisition in
order to jitter the onset of the trials with respect to slice
acquisition.
MRI data analysis
The fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed in an
event-related manner, within the general linear model,
using SPM5 software (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, UK). Preprocessing consisted of
spatial realignment, slice-timing correction, normalization,
and spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel with a full
width at half-maximum of 5 mm. At the Wrst (subject)
level, we used a single statistical linear regression model
for all our analyses, as follows. Each trial was modeled as a
boxcar, of which the onset corresponded to feedback onset
and convolved with a standard hemodynamic response
function (HRF). To control for eVects of task diYculty, an
additional regressor that modeled target size was included
in the model. To correct for motion-related artifacts, sub-
ject-speciWc realignment parameters were modeled as
covariates of no interest. Linear contrasts of regression
coeYcients (contrast images) were computed at the individ-
ual subject level and then subjected to a second-level ran-
dom-eVect analysis. Three paired t Tests with an
uncorrected voxel threshold of P < .001 (T = 3.21), cor-
rected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level
(P < .005), were computed to reveal the diVerences
between erroneous and correct responses, between task-
related activity in the solo and the duo context, and between
error-related activity in the duo context and error-related
activity in the solo context. In order to investigate the
between-subject eVect of setting (cooperative, competitive),
contrast images of the comparison error(duo) > correct(duo)
were computed on the Wrst level for each setting. These
contrast images were then subjected to the second level
where a 2-sample t Test was performed with an uncorrected
voxel threshold of P < .001 (T = 3.36), corrected for multi-
ple comparisons at the cluster level (P < .005) (Friston
et al. 1996).
Results
Behavioral results and manipulation check
In the solo condition, the average hit rate was 63.2%
(SD = 5.1%). In the duo condition, the average hit rate was
63.0% (SD = 4.8%) in the cooperative and 63.7%
(SD = 2.7%) in the competitive setting, respectively. A
repeated-measures ANOVA demonstrated that perfor-
mance did neither diVer between solo and duo nor between
cooperation and competition (all ps > .60), which veriWes
that adapting the size of the target based on participants’
performance was successful. Similarly, mean ratings on
task diYculty did not diVer between the duo and the solo
condition (M = 46.3 mm and M = 46.1 mm, respectively;
P = .95) nor between the cooperative and the competitive
setting (Mcoop-duo = 44.9 mm, Mcomp-duo = 47.93 mm, P = .55;
Mcoop-solo = 43.8 mm, Mcomp-solo = 50.0 mm, P = .34). More-
over, there were no diVerences in reaction times between
correct and erroneous responses, between solo and duo con-
sequences, and between the cooperative and the competi-
tive setting (all ps > .32).
The exit questionnaire revealed that participants were
aware that their errors aVected the other player in the duo
condition as ratings signiWcantly diVered from 0
(M = 40.7 mm, t = 8.09, df = 33, P < .0001; no diVerence
between the cooperative and competitive setting: Mcoop =
38.0 mm, Mcomp = 44.5 mm, P = .53). However, partici-
pants were more annoyed by their own errors in the duo
condition than in the solo condition (M = 63.7 mm and
M = 58.6 mm, respectively; t = 1.75, df = 33, P = .045,
one-tailed), which also did not diVer between settings
(Mcoop-duo = 61.3 mm, Mcomp-duo = 67.1 mm, P = .46;
Mcoop-solo = 57.2 mm, Mcomp-solo = 60.6 mm, P = .66).
FMRI results
As expected, the main eVect of response type (erroneous
compared with correct responses) showed activation in the
error-monitoring network, including pMFC (4, 22, 36) and
bilateral insula (36, 20, 2; ¡42, 18, ¡10), and was indepen-
dent of setting and consequence (see Table 1 and Fig. 2).
When comparing overall task-related activity in the con-
text that implied consequences for others to overall task-
related activity in the condition that concerned only the123
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tion for the duo context in the posterior parietal cortices
(¡34, ¡68, 52; 42, ¡66, 48), mPFC (10, 38, 24) and the
left temporal pole (¡42, 14, ¡16) (see Fig. 3).
When comparing error-related activity in the duo context
to error-related activity in the solo context, enhanced activ-
ity in mPFC (¡10, 46, 42), extending to the left superior
frontal gyrus, was evident (see Fig. 4).
The comparison of the two settings in the duo condition
(cooperation vs. competition and the reverse comparison)
did not reveal any clusters above threshold.1
Table 1 Spatial coordinates of the local maxima of brain regions showing signiWcant eVects in the diVerent contrasts
Stereotactic coordinates correspond to the standard Montreal Neurological institute (MNI) brain
Contrast Anatomical region t value Cluster size P value Stereotactic 
coordinates (x, y, z)
Error > correct (R) posterior medial 
frontal cortex
9.13 1,025 <.001 4, 22, 36
R insula 8.85 902 <.001 36, 20, 2
L insula 6.48 632 <.001 ¡42, 18, ¡10
Duo > solo L posterior parietal cortex 7.41 249 <.001 ¡34, ¡68, 52
R posterior parietal cortex 7.41 144 <.001 42, ¡66, 48
(R) medial prefrontal cortex 6.26 373 <.001 10, 38, 24
L temporal pole 5.89 167 <.001 ¡42, 14, ¡16
Correctness £ consequence 
(Error > correct (duo) >
Error > correct (solo))
L medial prefrontal cortex 6.98 439 <.001 ¡10, 46, 42
Fig. 2 Sagittal and coronal 
view of error-speciWc brain acti-
vations in both contexts (duo and 
solo). Increased activation in 
pMFC (4, 22, 36) and bilateral 
insula (36, 20, 2; ¡42, 18, ¡10) 
was evident for erroneous 
compared with correct 
responses. Thresholded at 
T = 3.36, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster level
Fig. 3 Coronal and sagittal 
view of context-related brain 
activations. Increased activation 
in posterior parietal cortices 
(¡34, ¡68, 52; 42, ¡66, 48), 
mPFC (10, 38, 24), and the left 
temporal pole (¡42, 14, ¡16) 
was evident for the context 
which implied consequences for 
others (duo) compared with the 
condition that aVected only the 
agents themselves. Thresholded 
at T = 3.36, corrected for multi-
ple comparisons at the cluster 
level
1 In order to test whether the current fMRI results are aVected by
unequal sample sizes (N = 20 vs. N = 14) we re-ran the analyzes with
equal sample sizes of N = 14 and did not Wnd any diVerences in brain
activation for any of the contrasts reported.123
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The current study focused on performance monitoring in a
social context by investigating the diVerences in brain acti-
vations between errors that aVect only agents themselves
and errors that also have consequences for others. The
error-related activations in pMFC and the insula are in line
with previous Wndings (e.g., De Bruijn et al. 2009; Ridder-
inkhof et al. 2004) and occurred independently of the con-
sequence of one’s errors, i.e., whether the monetary
consequences were restricted to the agents themselves or
whether errors also aVected the other players’ bonus, and
also independent of the setting, i.e., whether one’s errors
resulted in monetary gain or loss with regard to the partner/
competitor. Similarly, activation of parietal cortices and
temporal poles has been previously reported with regard to
interactive games and Theory of Mind paradigms (Decety
et al. 2004; Olson et al. 2007). However, errors that implied
consequences for others speciWcally activated mPFC, an
important part of the mentalizing system (Frith and Frith
2003). Although neither thinking about other players nor
actually interacting with them was explicitly required for
performing the task, participants most likely engaged in
social reasoning as reXected by mPFC activity.
Engagement of the mentalizing system
When participants were aware of the fact that their actions
also had consequences for others, activation in temporal
pole, parietal cortex, and mPFC was evident. These areas
constitute the mentalizing system (Frith and Frith 2003) and
are likely to be responsible for integrating social information
in a particular context. Especially the temporal poles are
regarded as convergence zones of all sensory modalities
(Damasio et al. 2004) that enable us to develop both general
knowledge and momentarily conclusions about a particular
person in a particular situation. In the context of mentaliz-
ing, Frith and Frith (2003) argue that the temporal poles
generate a broad semantic and emotional framework which
facilitates processing of the current input. They might also
play a role in retrieving information about social schemas
and scripts, which helps “simulating” the experiences of
others and anticipating their goals (Gallagher and Frith
2003). A comparable role can be attributed to the posterior
parietal cortices which are involved in the sense of agency,
i.e., referring to the agent of an action and monitoring
whether self-produced actions are in accordance with their
consequences (David et al. 2008). Likewise, Decety et al.
(2004) report engagement of the posterior parietal cortices
during cooperation as well as during competition. The inde-
pendence of posterior parietal involvement from the speciWc
mental set is supported by the overall task-related activity
that was evident in the current study.
Moreover, activation in mPFC was enhanced when
actions aVected not only the agents themselves, but also
other players involved in the game situation. This was
observable both in the rather “tonic” mentalizing eVect
which was independent of the actual correctness of an
action, reXecting larger activation when another person is
potentially aVected than when playing alone, and particu-
larly when contrasting error trials that do and do not have
consequences for others. Whereas the former might indi-
cate mentalizing processes that operate relatively automati-
cally in the background during the whole course of the duo
condition, the strong mPFC activation in response to errors
can be explained by our design: Importantly, correct
responses did not have an eVect on any player’s score; only
errors altered their bonus. Crucially, this was implemented
through the payoV structure that linked errors as speciWc
actions to monetary consequences for participants.
Although committing an error always entailed a monetary
loss for oneself, whether playing alone or in a cooperative
or competitive setting, participants were more annoyed by
errors made in the duo condition than in the solo condition.
Fig. 4 Sagittal and axial view 
of diVerential error- and context-
related brain activations. 
Increased activation in mPFC 
(¡10, 46, 42) was evident for er-
rors made in the context which 
implied consequences for others 
(duo) compared with errors 
committed in the condition that 
aVected only the agents them-
selves (solo). Thresholded at 
T = 3.36, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the cluster level123
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cance and stimulated mentalizing processes.
Implict and explicit mentalizing
Both settings, cooperation and competition, entailed a com-
mon activation pattern in mPFC, which reXects rather gen-
eral aspects of mentalizing and contradicts with the
context-speciWc demands suggested by Decety et al.
(2004). However, in our task, mentalizing takes place in
both settings and independently of the actual mental/aVec-
tive state of the other associated with the committed error.
Note that contrary to Decety et al.’s (2004), but similar to
Mitchell et al.’s (2006a) study, anticipating possible actions
of a partner or opponent was not part of the task. In previ-
ous experiments, mentalizing has often been implemented
rather explicitly by instructing participants to infer or judge
the mental states of others, including Wctional characters
and animated shapes (Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009). In
contrast, we used a design that involves implicit mentaliz-
ing as participants were not required to think about the
other participants and their intentions or actions. It has been
shown that the core mentalizing areas, especially mPFC,
are recruited during impression formation and spontaneous
processing of social information, thus without the deliber-
ate endeavor to make social judgments (Ma et al. 2010;
Mitchell et al. 2006a).
Performance-monitoring perspective
A study by Hajcak et al. (2005) manipulated the motiva-
tional signiWcance of errors. When participants thought that
their performance was being evaluated by a person sitting
next to them, the ERN in response to committing errors was
larger. The authors argue that an error is more salient and
signiWcant when subjects are confronted with the prospect
of receiving evaluative feedback about their performance
(Hajcak et al. 2005). Along with the evaluation, partici-
pants were also observed while performing the task, which
is similar to our current paradigm and may lead to concerns
and worries about one’s reputation—a process that funda-
mentally depends on mentalizing. However, in Hajcak
et al.’s design, errors only aVected the actors’ own reputa-
tion; thus there were only negative consequences for
participants themselves without any implications for the
evaluators, whereas our central manipulation was that
errors also bore consequences for others. Koban et al.
(2010) investigated the impact of the social context (coop-
eration vs. competition) on brain potentials and found no
diVerences in the ERN between contexts when participants
were observed by their competitor or partner. However,
their design also lacked the direct consequences for both
oneself and the other player since only overall performance
(in two blocks, not trial-wise) determined the outcomes
(Koban et al. 2010). Previously published data (De Bruijn
et al. 2009) indicated that activity in pMFC was increased
for all types of errors, regardless of setting and agency. Yet,
the activation we found is located more anterior than the
usually reported generator of the ERN (Debener et al.
2005), which is more in line with its role in social infer-
ences and mentalizing.
Limitations
The asymmetrical manipulation that only errors, but not
correct responses, have consequences for oneself and oth-
ers might not be ideal under methodological consider-
ations. As errors were always associated with a negative
outcome in the current design, no inferences about reward
processing in terms of positive valences can be made. A
previous study addressed this topic in detail (De Bruijn
et al. 2009) and demonstrated an eVect of setting for stria-
tal, but not for medial frontal areas. As our focus was not
on reward-related processes, but on contrasting brain
activity between errors that aVect only the actors them-
selves and errors that also have consequences for others,
we chose not to reward correct actions either way (neither
for oneself nor others). However, our results do indicate
that mentalizing does not depend on the valence of an
error for the other player (i.e., whether it entailed a monetary
loss or gain).
Moreover, it would be helpful to include standard The-
ory of Mind paradigms as well as control tasks in future
studies in order to assess the overlap between diVerent par-
adigms, i.e., explicit and implicit mentalizing tasks, prefer-
ably in within-subject designs.
DiVerentiation between pMFC and mPFC
The recent meta-analysis of Van Overwalle (2010) pro-
poses a distinction between pMFC and mPFC based on
both coordinates and function: Whereas the pMFC
(between 0 and 30 mm on the y-coordinate) is involved
in conXict- and error-processing, the mPFC (between 30
and 60 mm) is recruited during mentalizing and social
reasoning (Van Overwalle 2010). Our results underline the
diVerentiation between pMFC and mPFC nicely by disen-
tangling brain activity that is related to error-processing
from social inferences pertaining to the consequences that
one’s errors imply for others.
Conclusion
To conclude, the current study was the Wrst to investigate
the neural mechanisms involved in processing own errors123
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results demonstrate that performance monitoring in social
contexts engages additional processes and brain structures
compared with individual performance monitoring where
errors only have consequences for the person committing
them. When bearing in mind how one’s own actions aVect
others, mentalizing plays an important role. Performance
monitoring in social contexts is likely to be a highly com-
plex process that becomes increasingly diYcult when out-
comes are uncertain or ambiguous, as often in real life. This
is particularly evident in symptoms of obsessive–compul-
sive disorder, i.e., intrusions that one’s actions will harm
others, especially loved ones, and the arising fear of taking
the wrong action. Further research in both healthy and psy-
chiatric populations might elucidate how the relationship
between the agent and other individuals involved could
modulate these processes and their potential disturbance.
Psychiatric patients with clear social deWcits may show
impaired performance monitoring in social contexts, while
this may not be apparent when looking at individual perfor-
mance monitoring. For patients with depression, additional
factors like negative internal attributions and self-blame or
the experience of uncontrollability might lead to an alter-
ation of behavior in diVerent social contexts where errors
have a special signiWcance.
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